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National Securities Exchange Liability to Public
Investors: Time to Overcome Inertia?
Charles E. Drophin *
I. Introduction
A right of action against a national securities exchange for damages is not
expressly authorized under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and
may be maintained only if it is judicially implied. The first decision holding that
public investors may assert a private action against an exchange under section 6
for breach of duty, Baird v. Franklin,2 suggested such a right of action could be
implied under two possible theories. First, under a tort theory, members of the
class a statute is created to protect (investors) may sue for damages resulting from
statutory violations. Second, under contract theory, investors are intended bene-
ficiaries of the registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in which an exchange agrees to enforce its members' compli-
ance with the provisions of the Exchange Act and rules promulgated thereunder.
Although it did mention the third party beneficiary theory, Baird was based on
tort theory.
Baird has been followed in several subsequent decisions. 3 In Weinberger v.
New York Stock Exchange,4 the contract theory was expressly recognized as a device
to extend the statute of limitations. The class of members having standing to
maintain a private right of action under section 6 was later expanded through
judicial construction of the term "investors." In cases such as New York Stock Ex-
change v. Sloan5 and Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. ,6 the courts held that even
limited partners of and subordinated lenders to members of a national securities
exchange fell within the purview of section 6.7 In Lank v. New York Stock Ex-
change8 and Arnei v. Ram9sey, 9 however, the Second Circuit halted that develop-
ment and declared that the class of persons having an implied right of action
* B.A., 1974, Williams College; J.D., 1977, Harvard Law School; Member of the New York Bar.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976 & Supp. 1978).
2 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cerit. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
3 See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875
(1974); Phillips v. American Stock Exch., [1974-75 Transfer B;nder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,035
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Alfred, Kohn, Wood, Walker & Co., 373 F. Supp. 140
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Steinberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,599 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Caddell v. Goodbody & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,938 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Kroese v. New York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
4 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See notes 125-131 infra and accompanying text.
5 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
7 See also Miller v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,606 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (limited partner); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976) (subordinated lender); Fischer v. New York Stock Exch., 408 F. Supp. 745
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (subordinated lender); Carr v. New York Stock Exch., 414 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(private investors in brokerage house).
8 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977).
9 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977).
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against an exchange was limited to public investors. The Lank and Ameil deci-
sions recognized the potential conflict between the interests of public investors
and those of member firm investors and their creditors, which could hamper ef-
fective exchange regulation. 10
The Supreme Court of the United States has never considered whether a
private right of action against a national securities exchange should be judicially
implied under section 6 following the tort theory of Baird or the contract theory
of Weberger. However, beginning with Cort v. Ash ' I and culminating in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington1 2 and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. V. LewisQ3 the
Supreme Court has laid out specific tests to determine whether a private right of
action may be implied under a federal statute. This article re-examines Baird and
its progeny in the context of Supreme Court pronouncements on implying a pri-
vate right of action.
The hallmark case of Cort v. Ash 14 involved a shareholder suing individually
and derivatively to recover corporate political expenditures allegedly made in
violation of section 610 of the Federal Campaign Finance Act, a criminal stat-
ute. 1 5 The Court held that the corporation on whose behalf the shareholder sued
did not have an implied private right of action for damages under section 610.
The Court summarized the inquiries relevant to determining whether a private
right of action should be implied:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especiat benefit the statute was en-
acted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?. Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?16
Noting "the intent to protect corporate shareholders particularly was at best a
subsidiary purpose of Section 610," the Court found1 7 the other factors either
were "not helpful or militate against implying a private cause of action."18
10 A classic example concerns an exchange's response to a violation of the net capital rule by a
member firm. The net capital rule prescribes the extent to which a member's aggregate indebtedness can
exceed its net capital and is aimed at ensuring the financial solvency of member firms. To protect cus-
tomer accounts, an exchange may seek to continue the operation and existence of the member firm (with
restrictions such as a proscription against incurring any additional liabilities) to enable the firm's custom-
ers to transfer their accounts in an orderly fashion to other brokers. On the other hand, investors in the
member firm, depending on their perceptions of the health of the firm, would either demand that the
exchange (i) impose no restrictions on the business and allow the firm to work out its problems (premised
on the belief that the firm will survive the crisis and that the exchange should do nothing which could
impair short-term firm profitability) or (ii) close down the firm (viewing the business as incapable of resus-
citation and seeking to minimize overall losses to member firm partners and subordinated lenders). Such
tensions between the interests of public investors and investors in the member firms can lead to irreconcila-
ble conflict and place an exchange in a "Hobson's choice" situation.
11 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
12 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
13 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
14 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
15 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496 (1976)).
16 422 U.S. at 78.




In Piper v. Chns-Craf Industries19 the Court applied the same four criteria in
determining whether an unsuccessful tender offeror could maintain a private
right of action for damages under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act.20 Section
14(e) contains a broad anti-fraud prohibition, similar to rule lOb-5, 2 1 applicable
to corporate tender offers. Beginning its analysis, "of course, with the statute
itself," the Court observed that section 14(e) "makes no provision whatever for a
private right of action, such as those explicitly provided in other sections of the
1933 and 1934 Acts." 22 Considering the legislative history and concluding it con-
tained no hint Congress had contemplated a private right of action for damages,
the Court applied each of the four Cort inquiries. According to the Court, the
legislative documents merely evinced an intent to curb the unregulated activities
of tender offerors. Further, institutional limitations upon the SEC to police all
violations "alone do not lead to the conclusion that any party interested in a
tender offer should have a cause of action for damages.
' 23
Santa Fe Industries v. Green24 dealt with an action by minority shareholders
alleging a short-form merger under Delaware law violated rule 1Ob-5 2 5 because
the defendant had sought to freeze the plaintiffs out at an inadequate price and
because the merger was undertaken without prior notice to the plaintiffs. Again,
the Court emphasized that the starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself. The Court concluded that the section 10(b) 26
language gave no indication Congress meant to prohibit conduct not involving
manipulation or deception. Although it regarded the language of the statute as
sufficiently clear to be dispositive, the Court found its conclusion reinforced when
the Cort inquiries were made.
27
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington28 marks the Court's most explicit directive
regarding the standards for implying a private right of action for damages. Like
Piper29 and Santa Fe Industries,30 Redington involved the existence of a private right
of action under the Exchange Act. The Court ruled that the inquiry must end if
by its terms a statute grants no private rights to any identifiable class and pros-
cribes no conduct as unlawful and if the legislative history does not speak to the
issue of private remedies. The question is exclusively one of statutory construc-
tion.
Redington arose out of events preceding the liquidation of Weis Securities,
Inc., a member of the New York Stock Exchange, pursuant to the provisions of
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. The Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) 3' and the court-appointed SIPC trustee each sued the ac-
counting firm, Touche Ross & Co., for improperly auditing and certifying the
19 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
22 430 U.S. at 24.
23 Id. at 41.
24 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
26 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
27 430 U.S. at 477.
28 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
29 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
30 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-111 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
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1972 Weis financial statements and for improperly preparing answers to the Ex-
change's financial questionnaire. The complaint asserted that such conduct vio-
lated section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires brokers and dealers to
maintain certain records subject to examination by the SEC "as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors .... ,,32
The Court rejected SIPC's argument that tort principles sanction the impli-
cation of a private right of action under section 17(a). Writing for the majority,
Justice Rehnquist noted that such reasoning was "entirely misplaced"3 3 since
"the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does
not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person."
'3 4
Emphasizing that the existence of a statutory right of action is solely a matter of
statutory construction,3 5 the Court turned to the statutory language to determine
congressional intent. Finding section 17(a) did not expressly create a private
right of action in favor of anyone, the Court then examined the legislative his-
tory. Since the legislative history was also silent regarding a private right of ac-
tion, the Court refused to infer such a remedy from the absence of any explicit
congressional statement denying it. The Court emphasized:
[I]mplying a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazard-
ous enterprise, at best. And where, as here, the plain language of the provision
weighs against implication of a private remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion
whatsoever in the legislative history that § 17(a) may give rise to suits for damages
reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action implicit within the section.
3 6
The Court further supported its conclusion by noting that express private
rights of action are granted in section 9(e) (prohibition against manipulation of
security prices);3 7 section 16(b) (prohibition against purchase and sale, or sale
and purchase, of any equity security of an issuer within a six-month period by
any 10% equity security owner, officer, or director);38 and section 18(a) (liability
for misleading statements in SEC filings).3 9 "Obviously, then, when Congress
wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so
expressly."
'40
The Court addressed four other SIPC arguments particularly relevant to the
existence of an implied private right of action under section 6. First, SIPC con-
tended that implication of a private remedy was necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of the section and was properly a matter of federal concern. According to
the Court, however, "such inquiries have little relevance."
The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or
by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cori-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose-
are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. Here, the statute
by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no con-
32 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
33 442 U.S. at 569 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970)).
34 Id. at 568 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing)).
35 442 U.S. at 568.
36 Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
37 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
38 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
39 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
40 442 U.S. at 572.
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duct as unlawful. And the parties as well as the Court of Appeals agree that the
legislative history of the 1934 Act simply does not speak to the issue of private reme-
dies under § 17(a). At least in such a case as this, the inquiry ends there: The ques-
tion whether Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a
private right of action, has been definitely answered in the negative.
4 1
Second, SIPC argued thatj.i Case Co. v. Borak42 required implication of a
private right of action. The Court found Borak's invocation of the "remedial
purposes" of the Exchange Act unavailing:
To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the Court in Borak,
it suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak we have adhered to a stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter
standard today. . . . The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether the Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Con-
gress enacted into law.
43
The Court also rejected SIPC's arguments that either section 27 of the Ex-
change Act,44 which grants jurisdiction to the federal courts, or the rules adopted
under section 17(a) 45 can themselves imply a damage remedy even if section
17(a) itself does not. It is the substantive provisions of the Exchange Act that
control, not the jurisdictional provision or the rules.
Thus, Redinglon establishes that: (1) principles of statutory construction are
to be used exclusively in determining the existence of a statutory right of action;
(2) in construing a statute, a court must examine express statutory language, leg-
islative history, and the general statutory scheme or framework to ascertain con-
gressional intent; and (3) no private right of action may be implied without a
showing of affirmative legislative intent.4 6 Redington reflects the Court's commit-
ted effort to brake the trend whereby private rights of action are judicially im-
plied despite statutory silence. Fifteen of the Supreme Court's eighteen most
recent decisions involving federal securities law have reversed expansive interpre-
tations of federal securities law by the lower courts while three decisions have
affirmed lower courts' restrictive interpretations.
4 7
41 442 U.S. at 575-76 (citations omitted).
42 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
43 442 U.S. at 578.
44 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
45 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
46 442 U.S. at 577-78 & n.18.
47 In this regard, see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), rea'g 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC is
required to establish scienter to enjoin violations of§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act, rule 10b-5, and § 17(a)(l) of
the 1933 Act, but is not required to establish scienter to enjoin violations of §§ 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the
1933 Act); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), rea' 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978) (a person
who learns from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is planning a takeover of a second
corporation has no duty under Exchange Act § 10(b) or rule lOb-5 to disclose the impending takeover
before trading in the target company's securities); Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979), rev'g in part, af'g in part, Lewis v. Transamerica Corp. 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978) (there is no
implied private right of action for damages under Investment Advisors Act § 206, and only a limited
private right of action for certain equitable relief under Investment Advisors Act § 215); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), rervg 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978) (there is no implied private right
of action for damages under Exchange Act § 17(a)); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551 (1979), rev'g 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) (the Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not apply to
noncontributory, compulsory pension plans); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), revg
Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1977) (federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction
to entertain interlocutory appeals from denial of class action certification); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,(1 9 78 ), ret'g Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1976) (absent special circum-
stances, plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action must bear the expense of identifying class members);
[Vol. 56:419]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Consistent with Redngton, the Supreme Court recently refused to imply a
private right of action for damages under section 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940,48 a provision analogous to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.4 9 In
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 5° the Court stated that Congressional
intent is "dispositive." 51 Since section 206 neither proscribed certain conduct
nor, by its terms, created or altered any civil liabilities, the Court refused to "read
into the Act" a remedy not expressly provided for by the draftsmen.
52
II. Baird v. Franklin-The Tort Theory Re-examined
As noted previously, Baird v. Frankl'n 53 provides judicial authority for imply-
ing a private right of action under section 6 for an exchange's breach of duty.
The recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above limiting the implication of
a private right of action under section 6 warrant Baird's reconsideration.
Baird involved a suit by a customer against the New York Stock Exchange
arising from a member broker's embezzlement. 54 Although the district court had
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), affg 547 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1976) (SEC lacks authority under Exchange
Act § 12(k), based upon a single set of circumstances, to issue a series of summary orders suspending
trading in a stock for more than an initial 10-day period); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
rev'g 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976) (no implied private right of action for damages under Exchange Act
§ 10(b) or rule lOb-5 for alleged breach of fiduciary duties in connection with short-form merger may be
brought absent allegations of manipulation or deception); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977),
rev'g 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975) (no implied private right of action for damages for a tender offeror suing
in its capacity as a takeover bidder under Exchange Act § 14(e)); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438 (1976), rev'g 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975) (in an action under Exchange Act § 14(a), standard of
materiality contemplates a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omit-
ted fact would have assumed actual significance in the reasonable shareholder's deliberations); Radza-
nower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976), aJ'g 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975) (national banks can be
sued only in the district in which they are established, as required by 12 U.S.C. § 94, notwithstanding the
more liberal venue provision of Exchange Act § 27); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
rev'g 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974) (maintenance of private right of action for damages under Exchange
Act § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 requires an allegation of "scienter," ie., intent to deceive, manipulate or de-
fraud); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976), afg 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.
1974) (in a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account for profits under Exchange Act
§ 16(b) only if he was a beneficial owner "before the purchase"); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49 (1975), rev'g 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974) (persons who may obtain injunctive relief under Ex-
change Act § 13(d) are limited to those who can show "irreparable harm"); United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), rev'g Forman v. Community Servs. Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974)
(purchases of cooperative apartment stock were not purchases of "securities" within the purview of the
federal securities laws); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), rev'g 492 F.2d 136
(9th Cir. 1973) (persons who may maintain a private right of action under rule lOb-5 for money damages
are limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412 (1975), rev'g SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974) (no implied
private right of action for customers of defunct brokerage firm exists under Securities Investor Protection
Act to compel SIPC to exercise its statutory authority for their benefit).
48 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
49 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
50 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
51 Id. at 24.
52 Id. at 19-20.
53 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
54 The factual predicate to the Baird decision arises from the scandalous Richard Whitney affair of
1938. Whitney was a former New York Stock Exchange president and senior partner in Richard Whitney
& Co., a member firm. While serving on the Exchange's Governing Committee, Whitney converted cash
and securities from the Exchange's Gratuity Fund (which was established, pursuant to the Constitution of
the N.Y.S.E., to provide payments to survivors of deceased members) and also converted customers' securi-
ties entrusted to his brokerage firm.
The Exchange learned of Whitney's misdealings in the Gratuity Fund in November 1937. However,
since Whitney's brother had quickly reimbursed the Fund, the Exchange took no action against Richard
Whitney. Indeed, the Exchange failed to investigate or take any disciplinary action against Whitney or his
[February 1981]
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dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim,55 the court of appeals re-
versed. The Second Circuit held the New York Stock Exchange "violated a duty
when it failed to take [timely] disciplinary action . . . after there was reason to
believe that [the broker] had converted . . . plaintiffs' securities."'5 6 While dis-
senting on the issues of burden of proof and causation, Judge Clark articulated
the court's reasons for concluding that a private right of action should be implied
under section 6.
First, Judge Clark relied on the familiar tort theory: "It is well established
that members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created may sue
for injuries resulting from its breach and that the common law will supply a
remedy if the statute gives none."' 57 Redzington expressly rejects the tort theory in
the following terms- "[T]he fact that a federal statute has been violated and
some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private right of action
in favor of that pers6n,"'58 quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago. 5 9
Second, Judge Clark spoke of the "necessity" of implying a private remedy.
Otherwise, he remarked, the legislation would be little more than "a snare and a
delusion."160 Redinglon considers the "necessity" argument irrelevant. Implica-
tion is solely a question of legislative intent where "the statute by its terms grants
no private rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct as unlaw-
ful." 6'
Third, Judge Clark relied on statutory "purpose." Noting that the Ex-
change Act contained 37 references to protecting the public, 62 Judge Clark ob-
served: "[I]f the investing public is to be completely and effectively protected,
§ 6(b) must be construed as granting to injured investors individual causes of
action to enforce the statutory duties imposed upon the exchanges."'6 3 Redington,
however, rejects the "remedial purpose" argument: "[G]eneralized references to
the 'remedial purposes' of the 1934 Act will not justify reading a provision 'more
broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.',64
Moreover, the Court expressly declined to read Borak65 "so broadly that virtually
every provision of the securities acts gives rise to an implied private right of ac-
firm until March 1938. By that time, Whitney's embezzlement of his customers' securities exceeded
$200,000. For a discussion of the Whitney affair, see J. BRooKs, ONCE IN GOLCONDA, A TRUE DRAMA OF
WALL STREET 1920-1938, 230-87 (1969).
55 Baird a. Franklin was tried without a jury before Judge Coxe, and judgment dismissing the com-
plaint was entered in the office of the Clerk of the Court. Civ. Nos. 42-7-354 and 42-8-295 (S.D.N.Y., Nov.
30, 1942). The Court found that (i) no private right of action could be maintained against an exchange
under section 6 of the Exchange Act (First Conclusion of Law) and (ii) "the agreement filed with the
S.E.C. by the N.Y.S.E. pursuant to Section 6(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not give to
these plaintiffs a right of action for any breach thereof" (Second Conclusion of Law).
56 141 F.2d at 238. Decisions subsequent to Baird have shown that knowledge is not a prerequisite to
maintenance of a section 6 action against a national securities exchange. Rather, the section 6 action is
negligence-based. See, e.g., Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534-F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S.
896 (1976) (New York Stock Exchange); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
57 141 F.2d at 245.
58 442 U.S. at 568.
59 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
60 141 F.2d at 245.
61 442 U.S. at 576.
62 141 F.2d at 244 & n.4.
63 Id. at 244-45.
64 442 U.S. at 578.
65 J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
[Vol. 56:419] 425
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tion."
66
Fourth, Judge Clark did not consider himself bound by the established prin-
ciple of statutory construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius. ' '67 Redizngton
adheres to this maxim. As the Court explained, "when Congress wished to pro-
vide a private damage remedy [under the Exchange Act], it knew how to do so
and did so expressly." 68
Fifth, Judge Clark did not examine statutory language or history for positive
indications of legislative intent. Indeed, subsequent cases citing Baird regarded
such an inquiry as unnecessary. 69 As stated by one court, "[m]ere silence is not
decisive." '70 Redinglon holds that legislative intent is the fundamental basis upon
which a private right of action may be imilied. 7 1 The Exchange Act's silence
should be determinative of the implication question.
In short, the Baird rationale has been discredited by Redizgton. Applying the
Redinglon standards to section 6 demonstrates that no private right of action
against an exchange should be implied in favor of public investors.
A. Statutorg Language and Legislative HTisoy
Redington requires a court to begin its analysis by examining the statutory
language. Section 6(a) of the Exchange Act 72 prescribes the terms for registra-
tion as a national securities exchange. Section 6(b) 73 requires an exchange "to
enforce compliance by its members and persons associated with its members"
with the provisions of the Exchange Act, SEC rules and regulations, and the rules
of the exchange itself. Section 6(b) also requires an exchange to formulate and
enforce rules to promote just and equitable principles of trade. Section 6(d)
74
sets forth the procedural standards to be utilized by an exchange in disciplining
members.
The language of section 6 makes no reference to any private right of action
66 442 U.S. at 577.
67 141 F.2d at 245. In this regard Judge Clark wrote:
Nor is there any validity to defendant's objection that, since §§ 9(c), 16(b), and 18(a), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(c), 78p(b), 78r(a), grant specific rights of action in certain circumstances, the
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" denies the implied right of action under § 6(b).
Those three sections deal with special matters only indirectly germane to the regulation of se-
curities exchanges; they provide for more unrestricted recovery than would be possible at com-
mon law; and they prescribe narrow statutes of limitation. Also § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a),
directly states that "the rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." As the Supreme Court has
very lately said: "Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that were
hostile toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation
of an act to its narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules may serve at times to
aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will
read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words
fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy."
Id. (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943)).
68 442 U.S. at 572.
69 See, e.g., Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 224-25 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961):
"Implied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which affirmatively indicates that
they are intended. On the contrary, they are implied unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention."
70 See Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407, 412 (E.D. La. 1969).
71 442 U.S. at 568.
72 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1976).
73 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976).
74 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1976).
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against an exchange. The statute merely sets forth the necessary preconditions
for registering an exchange (section 6(a))75 and contains a provision (section
6(b)), 76 phrased negatively, requiring the rules of an exchange to contain certain
provisions. Unlike prohibitory statutes such as section 10(b) 77 or 1478 of the Ex-
change Act, section 6 does not declare any exchange conduct unlawful.
The legislative history of section 6 also fails to disclose any evidence Con-
gress intended, or even considered, granting a private right of action against an
exchange. 79 Rather, debate centered on the extent of rulemaking and enforce-
75 The text of § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1976), reads as follows:
(a) An exchange may be-registered as a national securities exchange under the terms and
conditions hereinafter provided in this section and in accordance with the provisions of section
78s(a) of this title, by filing with the Commission an application for registration in such form as
the Commission, by rule, may prescribe containing the rules of the exchange and such other
information and documents as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
76 Section 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976), provides:
(b) An exchange shall not be registered as a national securities exchange unless the Com-
mission determines that-
(1) Such exchange is so organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the purposes
of this chapter and to comply, and (subject to any rule or order of the Commission pursuant to
section 78q(d) or 78s(g)(2) of this title) to enforce compliance by its members and persons associ-
ated with its members, with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and regulations thereunder,
and the rules of the exchange.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the rules of the exchange
provide that any registered broker or dealer or natural person associated with a registered bro-
ker or dealer may become a member of such exchange and any person may become associated
with a member thereof.
(3) The rules of the exchange assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of
its directors and administration of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall be
representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange,
broker, or dealer.
(4) The rules of the exchange provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees,
and other charges among its members and issuers and other persons using its facilities.
(5) The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts
and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coor-
dination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with re-
spect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination between
customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this
chapter matters not related to the purposes of this chapter or the administration of the ex-
change.
(6) The rules of the exchange provide that (subject to any rule or order of the Commission
pursuant to section 78(q)(d) or 78s(g)(2) of this title) its members and persons associated with its
members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of the provisions of this chapter, the
rules or regulations thereunder, or the rules of the exchange, by expulsion, suspension, limita-
tion of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction.
(7) The rules of the exchange are in accordance with the provisions ofsubsection (d) of this
section, and, in general, provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and persons
associated with members, the denial of membership to any person seeking membership therein,
the barring of any person from becoming associated with a member thereof, and the prohibition
or limitation by the exchange of any person with respect to access to services offered by the
exchange or a member thereof.
(8) The rules of the exchange do iiot impose any burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
77 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
78 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
79 See Note, Exchange Liability under Section 6ofthe Securities Exchange Act." The Eligible Plaintij9hoblem, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 112, 126 (1978). An excellent historical discussion of congressional attempts to enact
federal securities legislation prior to 1933 is presented in Lippman, The Securities Exchange Act ofl934 and the
Commerce Clause, 69 U.S. L. REV. 19 (1935).
[Vol. 56:419]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ment authority to be given a governmental regulatory agency vis-a-vis exchanges
and state agencies. 80
Committee reports, legislative debates, congressional hearings, statements of
the draftsmen, comments of interested parties, and contemporaneous law review
articles indicate no intention to afford public investors a right of action against
an exchange.8 ' Nor is there any dispositive statement regarding private rights of
action under section 6 in the legislative history surrounding passage of the Securi-
ties Acts Amendments of 1975.82
B. The SEC's Exclusive Aulhonty to Monitor Exchanges
Prior to passage of the Exchange Act in 1934,83 stock exchanges were consid-
ered private clubs.8 4 Organized as voluntary unincorporated associations, ex-
changes received virtually no governmental or judicial oversight.8 5 What little
judicial oversight there was merely focused on ensuring that exchangers adopted
and followed procedures conforming with the organization's constitution and by-
laws. The constitution and by-laws were considered a "contract by which each
member had consented to be bound, and which measure[d] his duties, rights and
80 See, e.g., Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on HR. 7852 and HR. 8720 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 22 (statement of Mr. Landis), 199, 226-27 (statement
of Mr. Whitney), 502 (letter from Mr. Allen), 669-770 (memorandum of Mr. Johnson) (1934); Stock Er-
change Practices: Hearings on S Res. 81, S Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currenty,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6566-76 (statement of Mr. Corcoran), 6625-26, 6638-39 (statement of Mr. Whitney),
6903-04 (statement of Mr. Hope), 6926 (statement of Mr. Legg), 6938 (statement of Mr. Bernheim), 7143
(memorandum of Mr. Wetsel), 7569-72 (statement of Mr. Redmond) (1934).
81 See generally Note, Implied Civil Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARV. L. REv. 858, 860
(1948).
82 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 137 (1975). The only reference to private rights of action in the legisla-
tive reports to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 occurs regarding the promulgation of section 21(h),
15 U.S.C. § 78w(h) (1976), which exempts SEC enforcement actions from pre-trial consolidation under 28
U.S.C. § 1407. The Commission requested this exemption realizing that
although both the Commission's suit for injunctive relief brought pursuant to express statutory
authority and a private action for damages fall within the general category of civil (as distinct
from criminal) proceedings, their objectives are really very different. Private actions for dam-
ages seek to adjudicate a private controversy between citizens; the Commission's action for civil
injunction is a vital part of the Congressionally mandated scheme of law enforcement in the
securities area.
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 254.
It can be argued that this reference to private rights of action constitutes an implicit approval or
recognition by Congress of the holding of Baird v. Franklin and its progeny. As stated by Judge Friendly,
"when a principle has become settled through court decisions, there is no occasion for Congress to speak
unless it wishes a change." Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21051 (2d Cir. 1980). On the
other hand, it can be argued that such a fleeting reference is not significant, or, alternatively, that the
reference to private actions "between citizens" indicates that Congress was not focusing on private suits
against quasi-administrative bodies such as national securities exchanges. The Supreme Court has pointed
out that the "search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage."
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.). Seegnerall Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1975). Any leap to congressional approval should be made very
cautiously, if at all.
It is the author's position that the 1975 amendments do not provide any meaningful basis upon which
to hold (or infer) that Congress approved of the implication of a private right of action under § 6 or
acquiesced to Baird and its progeny. These amendments merely reflect Congress's continuing silence on
the matter.
83 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1976 & Supp. 1978).
84 See, e.g., Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225 (1888) (New York Stock Exchange). See also
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1963). Seegeneraly Note, supra note 79, at 113 n.7.
85 See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission,





In 1913, the Pujo Committee recommended that the New York Stock Ex-
change be required to incorporate and submit to federal regulation.8 7 However,
the Exchange's position against legislative or judicial intervention prevailed. In
the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent congressional dis-
covery of exchange wrongdoing,8 8 debate shifted from whether or not there
should be outside regulation or supervision of exchanges to how much govern-
ment involvement there should be with exchanges. Recognizing that "if govern-
mental regulation attempts to do too much directly and to control and intervene
directly in the first instance over the whole field which it covers, it is in danger of
breaking down under its own weight and proving ineffective," 89 Congress struck
a compromise and afforded the exchanges a large measure of self-regulation. As
then SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas explained:
From the broad public viewpoint, such regulation can be far more effective [than
direct regulation] .... Self-regulation ... can be pervasive and subtle in its condi-
tioning influence over business practices and business morality. By and large, gov-
ernment can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That leaves untouched large
areas of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of government regulation but in
fact too minute for satisfactory control; some of it lying beyond the periphery of the
law in the realm of ethics and morality. Into these large areas self-government, and
self-government alone, can effectively reach. For these reasons such self-regulation is
by far the preferable course from all viewpoints.
90
The structure of the Exchange Act reflects congressional adherence to the
principle of exchange self-regulation. Thus, when read together, sections 6,91
1992 and 2593 of the Exchange Act constitute a self-contained, unified framework
for SEC control of securities exchanges.94 Section 6 establishes the conditions for
86 Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 596, 17 N.E. 225, 226 (1888). See, e.g., White v. Brownell, 2 Daly
329, 4 Abb. Pr. 162 (C.P.N.Y. 1868) (organization of stock brokers).
87 See Hearings before the Subcomm. ofthe House Comm. on Banking and Curreng on Investigation of financial and
AMoneta9 , Conditions in the United States under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and 504, 62 Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1913).
Earlier, the Hughes Commission had rejected the suggestion that the New York Stock Exchange be incor-
porated and placed more directly under the aegis of the state and the courts. See ANTWERP, THE STOCK
EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN 415-16 (1913), cited in Jennings, supra note 85, at 668 & n.31.
88 See, e.g., Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on Stock Exchange Practices, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933).
89 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on HR. 7852 and 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 513 (1934).
90 Address by SEC Chairman Douglas before the Bond Club of Hartford, Conn. (Jan. 7, 1938) (cited
in Jennings, supra note 85, at 678).
91 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
92 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976 & Supp. 1978).
93 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1976).
94 Seegenerally VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK ExcHANGE MEMBERS (1941). Dr. Vernon, a
senior financial statistician with the SEC, articulated two guiding principles for the regulation of the
securities marketplace--that the market be fair and that it be orderly. He wrote:
A 'fair' market bears the connotation of a market in which the individual investor need not
fear for the integrity of his broker, the safety of his funds, or the possibility that price movements
are being artificially controlled. An 'orderly' market is regarded as one in which there are no
'sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of securities' and consequently a market
which makes no unnecessary adverse contribution to the stability and well-being of the public
at large. The two major functions of regulation, therefore, are carefully distinguished: the goal
of fairness, directed primarily at the protection of the individual, may be looked upon as some-
thing in the nature of a police function, while the 'orderly market' aim, an aim intended to
benefit the general public interest, is more suggestive of the use by Government of economic
controls.
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exchange registration. Prior to granting an application for registration, the SEC,
pursuant to section 6(b), 95 must find that an exchange is "able to carry out" the
purposes of the Exchange Act and that its rules "in general protect investors and
the public interest."
In section 19(a) of the Exchange Act,96 the SEC is empowered to require
registered exchanges to discharge their self-regulatory responsibilities. Section
19(h)(1) 9 7 authorizes the SEC to discipline an exchange for violating the Ex-
change Act or any rules thereunder, or for failing to enforce compliance there-
with by a member or a person associated with a member. Pursuant to section 19,
the SEC has withdrawn the registration of a national securities exchange for fail-
ure to enforce compliance with the Exchange Act and the exchange's rules.98
That disciplinary proceeding was reviewed and affirmed under the Exchange
Act.9 9
Congress also granted the SEC jurisdiction to supervise the nature and
structure of exchanges. Under section 19(c), by rule the SEC "may abrogate,
add to, and delete from the rules of a self-regulatory organization . . . as the
Commission deems necessary or appropriate to ensure the fair administration of
the self-regulatory organization." 10 0
An SEC order may be reviewed by a federal court of appeals under section
25 of the Act. 10 ' That section provides the exclusive method for judicial review
of SEC orders. 10 2 Section 25(a)(4) specifically recognizes the SEC's expertise by
providing that SEC findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. 
10 3
Exchange self-regulation was reaffirmed in the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975.104 Although the total regulatory fabric needed strengthening, Congress
concluded that self-regulation had worked well and should be preserved. 10 5 The
amendments were designed to achieve these purposes "not only by clarifying reg-
Id. at 132. Accord, SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURrrIEs MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 13-15 (1963).
95 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976).
96 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1976).
97 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1976).
98 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(3) (1976).
99 See In re San Francisco Mining Exch., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7870, [1964-66 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 77,343, enforcedsub nom. San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d
162 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting exchange's "pervasive and abysmal abdication of responsibility"). The SEC's
power to discipline national securities exchanges recently was exercised in In re Philadelphia Stock Exch.,
Exchange Act Release No. 16,648, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,475. In this administrative
proceeding pursuant to Exchange Act § 19(h), the SEC charged the Philadelphia Stock Exchange with
violations of Exchange Act §§ 11A(c)(l) and 19(g) and rule I lAcl-1 promulgated thereunder. The pro-
ceeding was settled by entry of a consent order in which the Philadelphia Stock Exchange represented that
"it has made and has undertaken to make, extensive revisions in organizational structure, personnel, com-
mitment of resources, programs, policies and procedures designed to strengthen its market surveillance and
enforcement capabilities." Id. 82,999. The SEC also censured the exchange.
100 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
101 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1976).
102 See, e.g., SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441, 442 (2d Cir. 1937); American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v.
SEC, 93 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Sutro Bros. &Co. v. SEC, 199 F. Supp. 438, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
103 See, e.g., Exchange Buffet Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 244 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1957); Atlas Tack
Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 246 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1957); Shawmut Ass'n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791 (1st
Cir. 1945).
104 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 137 (1975).
105 S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, repr'ntedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 179, 201-
02. The Senate bill (S. 249) was passed in lieu of the House bill (H.R. 4111).
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ulatory responsibilities at all levels but also by assuring that the self-regulatory
organizations follow effective and fair procedures, that their activities are not
anticompetitive and that the Commission's oversight powers are ample and its
responsibility to correct self-regulatory lapses is unmistakable."' 0 6 The Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs observed that
[t]o the degree that there may have been undue deference to the self-regulatory orga-
nizations because of the cumbersomeness of the oversight mechanisms or the unavail-
ability of appropriately focused remedies, the Committee believes the Exchange Act
should be amended to correct the problem. However, the Committee also believes
that the successful performance of the Commission's oversight task necessarily in-
volves [its] willingness to take steps to assure that the self-regulatory agencies comply
with and advance the policies of the Exchange Act.107
The Committee expects the additional enforcement powers provided by the bill
to lead to an increased willingness on the part of the Commission to take formal
action when needed to assure adequate self-regulatory performance. Although the
Congress cannot mandate such a willingness, the Committee has no reason to believe
that the Commission . . .would not be responsive to such an explicit expression of
congressional intent. 108
Thus, the Exchange Act's legislative history demonstrates that the SEC, ex-
pressly entrusted with the national public interest by sections 2 and 4 of the Ex-
change Act, was granted the power and responsibility for overseeing the conduct
of registered exchanges. As the House Report states, "[a]lthough a wide measure
of initiative and responsibility is left with the exchanges, reserved control is in the
106 Id. "In the new regulatory environment created by the bill, self-regulation would be continued, but
the SEC would be expected to play a much larger role than it has in the past to ensure that there is no gap
between self-regulatory performance and regulatory need . Id. at 2, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 181.
107 Id. at 34, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 212.
108 Id. at 35, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 213. Principal amendments to the
Exchange Act, designed to strengthen the SEC's oversight powers (especially with respect to review and
enforcement of exchange rules) are contained in § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976 & Supp. 1978), and § 21, 15
U.S.C. § 78w (1976). In § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1976), the SEC, in addition to its power to
suspend and deregister a self-regulatory agency, is given the power to censure and place restrictions on the
activities, functions and operations of the self-regulatory agency. The Commission is directed to take
action against any self-regulatory organization upon a finding that the organization has failed to enforce
its own rules, SEC rules, or any applicable provisions of the Exchange Act. Section 19(h)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(h)(4) (1976), authorizes the Commission to censure or remove from office any officer or director of a
self-regulatory organization who willfuliy fails to enforce compliance with such rules or Exchange Act
provisions.
Sections 21(e) and 21() of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78w(e)-() (1976), were strengthened to enable the
SEC to apply to the federal courts for an order enjoining the violation of the rules of a self-regulatory
organization. Jurisdiction of the district courts was concomitantly expanded to enable the courts, upon
application by the SEC, to command (1) a member or participant in a self-regulatory organization to
comply with, and (2) a self-regulatory organization to enforce compliance by its members and persons
associated with its members with the Exchange Act and Commission and exchange rules. As noted in the
Senate Report, "in the unlikely event that a self-regulatory organization is not enforcing the Exchange Act
or its own rules in an appropriate manner, the SEC should have no reluctance to utilize the courts to
compel the organization to do so."
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 135, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 312.
Section 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1976), dealing with judicial review, was also revised to provide for review
of SEC rules (including those approving and disapproving self-regulatory actions) as well as SEC orders.
These statutory changes, which typify the thrust of the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, provide
the clearest example yet of Congress's intent to continue the principle of exchange self-regulation within
the existing statutory framework. Whether the 1975 amendments were intended to supplant Baird or
supplement Baird, however, is a matter open to speculation.
[Vol. 56:419]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Commission if the exchanges do not meet their responsibility."' 10 9 Likewise, the
Senate Report states that "it is essential to entrust the administration of the act
to an agency vested with power to eliminate undue hardship and to prevent and
punish evasion."' I10 In a letter to Congress, President Roosevelt pointed out that
"the Government should be given such definite powers of supervision over ex-
changes that the Government itself will be able to correct abuses which may arise
in the future.""' The Supreme Court has noted that supervised self-regulation,
although consonant with the traditional private governance of exchanges, allows
the government to monitor exchange business in the public interest."l
2
Consistent with the foregoing authority, a court should not imply a private
right of action against an exchange under section 6. The Exchange Act contem-
plates that the SEC alone is empowered to sue for an injunction or for manda-
mus, or to censure, suspend or expel an exchange for statutory violations, subject
to appellate review. This conclusion is borne out by a 1973 legislative study deal-
ing with the securities industry's performance."X3 After a thorough review of the
Exchange Act's operation since its inception, the study observed that "[n]o provi-
sion of the Exchange Act confers jurisdiction upon the courts to directly review
the self-regulatory activities of national securities associations."'1 I4  Rather,
"Commission oversight is the catalyst which creates jurisdiction in the courts to
review exchange . . . decisions." 115 Although sections 6, 19 and 25 were
amended in 1975,' 16 no changes were made in the statutory language which
would authorize private remedies.
Except where private rights of action are specifically enunciated, the entire
scheme of the Exchange Act reflects a determination that the statutory mandate
will be achieved through the SEC's efforts.' 7 The conclusion that the SEC alone
is empowered to take action against an exchange under section 6 follows from
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers. 118 In
that case the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act)' 9 provided an
express remedy giving the Attorney General the right to institute a civil action.
The Court held that the express provision of a remedy to the Attorney General
precluded inferring a civil action in favor of the plaintiffs. Similarly, in Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,' 2 0 the Court recognized the impropriety
of implying a private right of action from a statutory provision whose enforce-
ment had been left to the SEC. The mere fact the statute was designed to protect
investors was not dispositive and did not require judicial implication of addi-
109 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
110 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
111 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
112 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1973).
113 SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY: REPORT OF THE SEN. SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES, COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as
SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY].
114 Id. at 210.
115 Id. at 214.
116 See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 137 (1975).
117 See generaly Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934. An Experiment in Administrative Law, 47
YALE LJ. 622, 624-26 (1938).
118 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
119 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
120 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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tional remedies. 1 2 As stated by the Court:
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the nega-
tive of any other mode." Congress expressly provided both judicial and administra-
tive means for enforcing compliance with § 206 [of the Investment Advisers Act].
First, under § 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal offenses, punishable by
fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring
civil actions in federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including, of course,
§ 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by § 203 to impose various administra-
tive sanctions on persons who violate the Act, including § 206. In view of these ex-
press provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is highly improbable
that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action.",
1 22
This reasoning applies equally to the Exchange Act, a predecessor of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act.
III. Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange: The Contract
Theory Re-examined
Prior to the Securities Act Amendments of 1975,123 section 6(a) (1) contained
a provision requiring an exchange to file an "agreement . . . to comply and en-
force so far as is within its powers compliance by its members, with the provisions
of this Act, and any amendment thereto and any rule or regulation made or to be
made thereunder."1 2 4 In Weinberger v. New York Stock Exchange,' 25 the district
court construed the section 6(a)(1) "agreement" between the SEC and an ex-
change as a contract giving public investors rights as intended third party benefi-
ciaries. 126 The court then concluded that the plaintiffs' claim "should be
121 Id. at 24.
122 Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
123 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 137 (1975).
124 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(1) (1934) then provided:
(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national securities exchange
under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this section, by filing a registration
statement in such form as the Commission may prescribe, containing the agreements, setting
forth the information, and accompanied by the documents, below specified:
(1) An agreement (which shall not be construed as a waiver of any constitutional right or
any right to contest the validity of any rule or regulation) to comply, and to enforce so far
as is within its powers compliance by its members, with the provisions of this title, and any
amendment thereto and any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder;
As part of its compliance with section 6(a)(1), the Exchange filed with the SEC the "agreement" set
forth below.
The New York Stock Exchange hereby agrees, upon the express understanding that such
agreement shall not be construed as a waiver of any constitutional right of the Exchange or
any member thereof, or of any right of the Exchange or any member thereof to contest the
validity of any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or of any rule or regulation
made pursuant thereto, (a) to comply and to enforce so far as is within its powers compli-
ance by its members with the provisions of Title I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and any amendment thereto and any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder,
and (b) to furnish to the Commission three copies of any amendments to the rules of the
Exchange forthwith upon their adoption.
125 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Plaintiff was a former limited partner of Ira Haupt & Co.,
which had been victimized in the infamous "Salad Oil Swindle." Ira Haupt & Co. had extended multi-
million dollar credits to a vegetable oil refining company, receiving as collateral warehouse receipts which
proved to be bogus.
126 The court relied for its conclusion on RESTATEMENT OF CoNT PAcTs § 145 (1932), which states:
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or municipality by contract to do an act or
render a service to some or all of the members of the public, is subject to no duty under the
contract to such members to give compensation for the injurious consequences of performing or
attempting to perform it, or of failing to do so, unless,
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governed by the statute of limitations applicable to contracts." t 2 7 Although
Baird had suggested that public investors might have contractual rights as third
party beneficiaries of the agreement filed by an exchange,t 28 Baird did not ex-
pressly pass upon this issue.
129
The Weinberger decision lacks a solid foundation because the "agreement"
required by section 6(a)(1) did not impose any duty or grant any benefits that
did not already exist by virtue of the statute. As the court conceded, the only
basis for implying that any "contract" was intended to afford third party benefi-
ciary rights is that the statute itself, as interpreted in Baird, created a duty for the
benefit of public investors. 130 Moreover, Weinberger's conclusion that the agree-
ment required by section 6(a)(1) "achieves a status of its own as a contract" 1 3' is
not supported by the authorities the court relied upon. In each case cited, the
contract had independent significance even though it also expressed a duty re-
quired by statute.
For example, Fata v. S.A. Hea.'y Co. 132 involved a public works contract in
which the defendant had agreed to construct public works for a city. A New
York statute required the contract to state that each laborer would be paid wages
according to the statute. The plaintiff sued to recover the difference between his
pay and the amount specified in the contract. The contract was not entered into
merely to require the contractor to pay statutory wages but also to create duties
a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of the circum-
stances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall compensate members of the pub-
lic for such injurious consequences.
The court found such an intent implicit in the statute and, afortiori, in the contract filed pursuant to the
statute. 335 F. Supp. at 143-44. Judge Gurfein discounted the concerns expressed by Judge Cardozo in
H.R. Moch Co. v. Renssalaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928), regarding the disruptive
effect of unexpected liability. In this instance, said the court, there would be no unexpected liability since
Baird had already held that exchanges were liable for breach of its statutory duties. 335 F. Supp. at 144
n. 10. See generaly Note, Exchange Liabilifor Alet Capital Enforcement, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1262, 1277-78
(1973).
127 335 F. Supp. at 145. Since the Exchange Act provided no statute of limitations period with respect
to this contract claim, the court, consistent with Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947), looked to the
appropriate statute of limitations of the forum state (New York). The contract statute of limitations in
New York is six years, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 213(2) (McKinney 1971), whereas the statute of limitations
for violation of a statute is three years, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 214(2) (McKinney 1971).
Had the court not adopted the contract rationale, with its longer statute of limitations period, plain-
tiff's action would have been time-barred. The sympathetic plight of plaintiff may have been a factor in
the court's determination. See note 125 supra. Still, it seems anomalous for a court to recognize a six year
limitation period when an exchange is only required by law to maintain its records for five years. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1979).
The limitations question raised in Weinberger has never been formally reviewed by any federal court of
appeals. The issue was certified for appeal and accepted by the Second Circuit in Lank v. New York Stock
Exch., 548 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1977), but Lank was decided on other grounds. See text accompanying notes 8-
10 supra. In Wilson v. Meyerson & Co., Civ. No. 72-1298 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 1976), the court implicity
rejected the contract statute of limitations in favor of the limitations period for a liability created by
statute. The court noted that a liability created by statute exists where the cause of action raised was
unknown at common law. At common law, a claim against an exchange for breach of a duty to supervise
its members did not exist. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
128 See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.), cert. dentd, 323 U.S. 737 (1944): "Our considered
opinion is that the [Exchange] Act itself grants the right of action: hence it is unnecessary to consider the
narrower contract problem."
129 Judge Gurfein viewed the contract issue as an apparent matter of first impression, 335 F. Supp. at
142, although Judge Coxe, also of the Southern District of New York, previously had rejected the contract
contention. See note 55 supra.
130 335 F. Supp. at 144.
131 Id. at 145.
132 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E.2d 339 (1943).
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of and benefits for both the contractor and the city regarding the construction
project. Also, the contract did not merely recite the obligations in the terms of
the statute. The contract contained a detailed agreement to pay wages according
to a schedule annexed to the contract. The court held: "The obligation thus
assumed by the contractor is precise, and extends beyond the scope of the statu-
tory obligation. The statutory remedy provided for breach of the statutory obli-
gation would be an inadequate and unsuitable remedy for a violation of this
contractual obligation."
1 33
Filardo v. Foley Brothers,'3 4 another case cited in Weinberger, involved a con-
struction contract with the United States government. A federal statute1 35 re-
quired the contractor to pay time and one-half for overtime. The construction
contract provided the defendant would "obey and abide by all applicable laws
. . . of the United States."' 3 6 The contract had a status independent of the stat-
ute since it covered all phases of the construction project. The court held a la-
borer had an implied right to recover overtime wages from the contractor
because such a right effectuated the purpose of the statute and because the la-
borer was a beneficiary of the construction contract. Similarly, in United States ex
rel. Johnson v. Mory Construction Co. 137 and in Lemon v. Bossier Parish School
Board,'38 the contracts went beyond a mere recital of a pre-existing statutory
duty and imposed burdens and gave benefits unrelated to a statutory duty.13 9
In the case of an exchange, however, an exchange gained no rights, except
the right to conduct business, by filing the section 6(a)(1) agreement in its regis-
tration statement.' 4 ° To hold otherwise would exalt form over substance.141
133 289 N.Y. at 406-07, 46 N.E.2d at 341-42.
134 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480 (1948), rev'don other grounds, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
135 40 U.S.C. § 325a (1940).
136 297 N.Y. at 225, 78 N.E.2d at 484.
137 98 F.2d 781, 788-89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 651 (1938).
138 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), aifd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
139 The only case cited in Weinberger to support its view that the agreement required by § 6 (a)(1) is "a
separate contract supported by mutual consideration," 335 F. Supp. at 144, is Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur
Dressing Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 462, 168 A. 862 (1933). In that case, the consideration for a "re-employment
agreement" with the President of the United States under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,
48 Stat. 195 (1933), was found to be "the benefit of the pledge of all other members of N.R.A. to patronize
their fellow members," id. at 468, 168 A. at 865. It seems plainly irrelevant.
140 The rights acquired by an exchange are subject to such conditions and restrictions, and amend-
ments to or revocations ofsuch conditions and restrictions, as Congress sees fit to impose. See, e.g., Fochi v.
Splain, 36 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942). The right of the exchange to conduct its business is
not a "franchise," as the Weinberger decision implies, 335 F. Supp. at 144, n.12, since a "franchise" cannot
be taken away by the United States except under the power of eminent domain. Set, e.g., New Orleans
Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 673 (1885). As the New York Court of Appeals stated in
Schram v. Cotton, 281 N.Y. 499, 507, 24 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1939): "A voluntary promise to assume a duty
or liability, which the law imposes even where there is no promise, creates no new duty or liability."
141 See Schram v. Cotton, 281 N.Y. 499, 24 N.E.2d 305 (1939). In Schram, defendant was sued by the
receiver of an insolvent national bank for recovery of the double liability imposed by the statute on stock-
holders of national banks. Defendant had consolidated his stockholdings with other stockholders in a
holding company. The articles of association of the holding company provided that the stockholders "sev-
erally agree that such liability may be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as statutory
liability." Id. at 506, 24 N.E.2d at 308. Defendant argued that a three-year statute of limitations for
liability created by statute found in N.Y. CODE CIv. PROC. § 394 (McKinney 1971) was to be applied
instead of the six-year contract statute of limitations in N.Y. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 382(1)(McKinney 1971).
The court adopted the three-year period for liabilities created by statute. Judge Lehman, after reciting the
principle that the contractual assumption of a duty already imposed by the law in the absence of such a
promise creates no new duty or liability, stated:
To hold that the action to enforce the statutory liability imposed upon stockholders of the bank,
which has been expressly assumed by the stockholders of the dominant corporation, is governed
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Presumably, the registration provisions of section 6 were couched in volun-
tary "agreement" terms to encourage the self-regulators to enforce compliance
with "ethical as well as legal standards."' 42 The ultimate power of oversight was
vested in the SEC by sections 19(a) and (b).I 43 The "agreement"' 144 was a condi-
tion precedent to Commission approval of an exchange's registration application
and comported with the position, espoused by the draftsmen of the Act, that
exchanges should be licensed.
For instance, in 1933 President Roosevelt directed Secretary of Commerce
Daniel Roper to appoint a Federal Interdepartmental Committee on Stock Ex-
changes (the "Roper Committee") to examine the extent to which governmental
control should supersede the existing system of exchange self-regulation. In Jan-
uary 1934, the Roper Committee recommended the federal licensing of ex-
changes.145 The Roper Report stated:
In the event a Federal license should be required of all exchanges as above pro-
posed there would be attached to the license as a condition of issue and continued
enjoyment the following requirement, viz.: That all exchanges desiring a Federal
liense must adopt and submit to the proposed Stock Exchange Authority for its ap-
proval, rules designed to comply with the regulatory requirements outlined by the
proposed statute and with such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the
proposed Stock Exchange Authority thereunder. Furthermore, as a condition of re-
taining a license an exchange would be required to abide by and enforce such regula-
by a different Statute of Limitations from that which governs an action to enforce the statutory
liability impliedly assumed by the stockholders of the bank when they acquire their stock,
would exalt form over substance.
281 N.Y. at 507, 24 N.E.2d at 308. Accord, Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U.S. 602, 613 (1904) ("It is a liability
created by the statute, because the statute is the foundation for the implied contract"); McClaine v.
Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 162 (1905).
Similarly, in Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 46 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1942), the court was
faced with a statute of limitations issue in a laborer's action for overtime compensation and rejected a
defense that the cause of action was subject to a two-year statute of limitations for contract actions rather
than a three-year statute for liability created by statute. Accord, Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., 45 F.
Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1942), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rosenberg v. Semeria, 137 F.2d 742 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 770 (1943); City Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 327 F.
Supp. 970, 973 (S.D. Ohio 1970), aJ'd, 446 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059 (1972) ("The
statute is as necessary a basis for the plaintiffs cause of action as it is for the jurisdiction of this Court");
Hire v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 324 F.2d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1963) ("the Labor Agreement pro-
vided for the benefit but the Act gave it vitality"). See generaly Bevelander v. Town of Islip, 10 A.D.2d 170,
171-72, 199 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (2d Dep't 1960).
142 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Prior to enact-
ment of the Exchange Act, exchanges viewed themselves as private clubs, insulated from governmental or
judicial control. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
143 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
144 An earlier draft of the proposed Exchange Act had not contained the term "agreement." See Hear-
ings on H.R. 7852 and 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1934). This language was added later, see H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934), notwithstanding the suggestion by the New York Stock Exchange that there be no reference
to an agreement. See Hearings on S Res. 84, S Res. 56 and S Res. 97 before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currenty, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7545 (1934). Judge Gurfein in Weinberger, in view of the legislative history,
concluded that the use of the term "agreement" was deliberate. 335 F. Supp. at 145.
There is no dispute with this proposition. On the other hand, the fact that the term "agreement" was
employed in the statute does not necessarily mean that the "agreement" thereby rose to the level of an
independent contract. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra. The "agreement" filed by the New York
Stock Exchange simply provided that the Exchange would act in accordance with the statutory mandate.
See note 105 supra.
145 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., STOCK EXCHANGE
REGULATION: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
WITH AN ACCOMPANYING REPORT RELATIVE TO STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION (Comm. Print 1934)
[hereinafter cited as ROPER REPORT].
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tory requirements and such rules and regulations. Any exchange would be permitted
to adopt any other or additional rules and regulations not inconsistent with the regu-
latory requirements outlined by the statute or the rules and regulations promulgated
by such proposed Stock Exchange Authority.
In order to entitle itself to a license, an exchange must submit its rules to the
Stock Exchange Authority, above described. These rules must contain provisions
embodying as a minimum at least the regulatory requirements suggested hereinafter
and must be in a form which satisfies the Authority that they are at least as stringent
as the standard set out in the statute, although they may be more so. If at any time,
on complaint or otherwise, the agency is satisfied that a particular licensed exchange is
not vigilantly or effectively enforcing any of the rules in question by expulsion, sus-
pension, fine or otherwise of its members, such exchange, after a hearing, if found
guilty, shall be deprived of its license, or suspended.'
46
Numerous other references to exchange licensing abound in the Roper Report, 147
the precursor of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.t48
During the legislative hearings, Thomas Corcoran, one of the principal
draftsmen of the Securities Exchange Act,' 49 repeatedly characterized the pro-
posed federal regulatory scheme in terms of a license. For example, Mr. Corco-
ran stated that "after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing the
Commission may suspend the registration of a securities exchange; that is with-
draw its license to do business."' 5 0 Similarly, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
John Dickinson, the Chairman of the Roper Committee, expressed the view that
"an exchange should not be licensed unless its rules and regulations provide ade-
quate prohibitions against unfair and improper practices and against practices
tending to the overstimulation of speculation."'
5'1
As has been suggested by the courts, a license is a permit to do what other-
wise would be unlawful. A license regulates and controls the manner in which a
business is conducted, and prevents its being carried on to injure public interests.
"A license is a mere privilege, and is not a contract." It does not create a vested
right.
52
In short, the purported "contract" is illusory. But for section 6, the duty of
an exchange to enforce its rules-and any cause of action for breach of that
duty-would not exist. 53 One commentator has observed:
A few courts have, without critical examination, cited We'nberger as standing for
the investor's right to recover as a third-party beneficiary of an exchange's contract
with the SEC. Still, it seems that that decision is incorrect. The contracts involved in
securities transactions are those between the exchange and its members and between
members and investors; the agreement filed by an exchange with the SEC under
former section 6 seems to be merely the satisfaction of the Exchange Act's then-ex-
146 Id. at 11, 12 (emphasis supplied).
147 See id at 4, 8-9, 20.
148 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976 & Supp. 1978).
149 See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S Res. 84, S Re. 56 and S Res. 97 before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Curreng, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6463 (1934).
150 Id. at 6566, 6569, 6573.
151 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on HR. 7852 and HA 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 505, 514-15 (1934).
152 Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha, 13 F.2d 500, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). See general4y Madden v. Queens
County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 255, 72 N.E.2d 697, 699, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
153 Cf. Frank Shepard Co. v. Zachary P. Taylor Publishing Co., 234 N.Y. 465, 468, 138 N.E. 409, 410
(1923) (for statute of limitations purposes, a liability created by statute means a liability which would not
exist butfor the statute).
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isting conditions precedent for licensing. . . . The mere fact that the statute called
for an exchange to include an agreement to enforce with the rest of its registration
statement should not transform the statutory duty into a contractual one.
Even if the agreement filed by an exchange with the SEC is considered a "con-
tract," it is not clear that an individual investor should be regarded as an "intended
beneficiary." Every contract made by a governmental unit or agency is presumably
made for the benefit of its citizens. Nevertheless, actual performance of the registra-
tion "contract" does not run to the investing public. Furthermore, it is doubtful
whether specific investment losses to individual investors are "foreseeable" within the
more restricted ambit of contract concepts of foreseeability.
i 54
Congress deleted the requirement for such an "agreement" in the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975155 with no apparent regard for any party's "contract"
rights. 
156
IV. Time on Overcome Inertia?
Since its decision in 1944, Baird v. Franklin 15 7 has been mechanically fol-
lowed by the lower courts.' 58  However, in view of Baird's reasoning, its conflict
with the principles set forth in recent Supreme Court decisions, t 59 and Congress's
recent reaffirmation of the SEC's dominant role in overseeing exchange perform-
ance under the Exchange Act,' 60 the precedential value of Baird v. Franklin
should be seriously questioned. Moreover, since the term "agreement" has been
deleted from an exchange's registration statement, the Weinberger contract theory
should be moribund. Recently, after applying the Redinglon and Transamerica
standards, the Ninth Circuit held that investors have no implied private right of
action under section 6 or stock exchange rules promulgated thereunder.' 6' Sev-
eral district judges in the Third Circuit have indicated their acquiescence in this
holding.' 62 In an effort to salvage Baird, a district judge in the Second Circuit,
the birthplace of Baird, was forced to conclude that the principles of Cor, as
refined by Redington and Transamerica, were "at least modified, and perhaps over-
ridden" in view of Baird's long history.'
6 3
154 Comment, Exchange Liabiliyfor Improper Enforcement of Its Constitution and Rules. The Investor's Right of
Action Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 24 EMORY L.J. 865, 878 (1975).
155 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 137 (1975).
156 In Weinberger, the court raised but did not decide the question whether the agreement itself could
sustain federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). See 335 F. Supp. at 146. The legislative
history demonstrates that the agreement was a precondition to licensing. If such an agreement could give
rise to federal question jurisdiction as an action which arises under the laws of the United States, then
presumably any federally licensed business or person (including lawyers admitted to practice before the
federal judiciary) could be sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by any member of the public claiming to be an
intended third party beneficiary of the license. A court should tread warily in this area. The author
believes that the deletion of the term "agreement" should render this issue moot, unless the present statu-
tory language in § 6(a) is so tortured as to give rise to an implied contract.
157 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
158 See Note, Exchange Liabilityfor Net CapitalEnforcement, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1262, 1273 (1973): "After
Baird, courts considering exchange liability have usually cited Baird, particularly Judge Clark's opinion, as
precedent and avoided elaborate supporting arguments."
159 See text accompanying notes 14-52 supra.
160 Id.
161 See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action under § 6
could be implied since there were no affirmative indications that Congress intended such a right).
162 See, e.g., Lenowitz Bi-Planning Security Corp. v. Philadelphia Stock Exeh., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 97,801 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Civ. No. 79-3475 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
163 See Rich v. New York Stock Exch., Civ. No. 73-4642 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Leval, J.). Rich arose out of
the demise of Weis Securities, Inc., a former member firm. See text accompanying notes 31-41 supra. But
see Verace v. New York Stock Exch., 478 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (suggesting in dictum that
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The broad and pervasive scope of the Exchange Act might be undermined
and its purposes frustrated, however, if different district courts intruded upon the
regulation expressly entrusted to the SEC. For example, a recent section 6 case,
Bag v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc. ,s64 concerned the extent to which the New
York Stock Exchange could be held liable for failing to supervise adequately the
actions of an employee of a member firm. Previously, the employee in question
had been suspended by the SEC for fifty days for making purchase recommenda-
tions in non-registered securities. The SEC, though, subsequently approved the
employee's re-employment by a brokerage firm in light of apparent good faith in
making such recommendations.
The New York Stock Exchange conducted its own investigation of the ques-
tioned transactions, acceded to the SEC's position regarding re-employment, and
advised his new employer, Pressman, Frolich & Frost, Inc., "to exercise more
than ordinary supervision" over the employee. Claiming to have been subse-
quently defrauded by the employee, the plaintiff sued the New York Stock Ex-
change, 65 the presumed deep pocket, and alleged that the Exchange itself was
required to monitor closely the actions of this particular employee.' 66 In denying
the Exchange's motion for summary judgment, the court believed the Exchange
should have provided more than ordinary supervision. 167 The Exchange argued
its duty had been discharged when it notified the member. At that time, compli-
ance with the Exchange's directive became the member's responsibility. Al-
though the claims were eventually dismissed, the case underscores the problem
resulting when courts second-guess exchange supervision and impose their own
notions of regulatory efficiency and equity upon self-regulatory organizations. 168
The problem of judicial interference increases when judicial determinations
conflict with those of the SEC. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. 169 illustrates this
point. In Hughes, the Ninth Circuit found the New York Stock Exchange had
the Redinglon analysis countermands implication of a private right of action under § 6 even for public
investors).
164 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,556 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1980).
165 The brokerage house was in liquidation.
166 At the time of the alleged breach of duty by the New York Stock Exchange in Bay (circa December
1972), the Exchange had 1,366 members, the majority of whom were associated with 558 member organi-
zations. Such member organizations had a total of 3,751 branch offices located in all 50 states, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands and more than 20 foreign countries. Those member organizations employed
approximately 51,000 persons as registered representatives. Not surprisingly, it has been held that an
exchange's duty to supervise its members is not "fluoroscopic." See Rich v. New York Stock Exch., 379 F.
Supp. 1122, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), re'don other grounds, 522 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975); Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exch., 350 F. Supp. 1122, 1124-25 (N.D. Il. 1972), aft'd, 503 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 875 (1974).
167 471 F. Supp. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
168 As noted by the court in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974):
Although the section 6 duty of self-regulation is framed in broad language, "to enforce so
far as is within its power", it is not a mandate of strict liability rendering the exchange a guaran-
tor of all fraudulent schemes consummated by its members whether in listed or unlisted securi-
ties. To so read section 6 would tear at the very fabric of self-regulation, a burden which indeed
no self-regulatory body could bear.
Seegenerallv Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 842 (1972); J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc. v. Haack, 387 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Aronson v.
McCormick, 13 Misc. 2d 1077, 178 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aftd, 6 A.D.2d 999, 177
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1958).
169 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
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violated its section 6 duties by lifting various restrictions imposed upon a member
firm that had violated the Exchange's net capital rule. The court wrote:
We are bothered by the fact that the action of the Commission paralleled that of the
Exchange in that the Commission lifted its prohibition on underwritings by the firm
at the same time that the Exchange lifted its restrictions. The breach in this case is so
clear, however, that the weight to be accorded to the Commission's action does not
alter our conclusion. 
170
Although the breach may have been "so clear" to the court of appeals, it was
not "so clear" to the district court which, in an opinion conceded by the court of
appeals to be a scholarly and prodigious effort, 1 7' found no such breach.172 And
the breach surely was not "so clear" to the SEC.
The SEC alone has "intimate familiarity with the characteristic features of
the [securities] industry .. ".. ,,73 Recognizing administrative expertise in Far
East Conference v. United States, 174 the Supreme Court gave, for the guidance of the
lower federal courts, a classic expression of the long-established principle of pri-
mary jurisdiction:
[A] principle, now firmly established, [is] that in cases raising issues of fact not within
the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative
discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not
be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by
specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially de-
fined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a partic-
ular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the cir-
cumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts
by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible proce-
dure. 1
75
Thus, subject to judicial review after action by the regulatory agency, the
determination of reasonable rail tariffs has been left to the Interstate Commerce
Commission; 76 the determination of unfair labor practices has been left to the
National Labor Relations Board;1 77 questions regarding the organization or op-
eration of a new bank by a bank holding company are within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Federal Reserve Board;' 78 and the evaluation of the antitrust
implications of certain practices of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is within
the purview of the Commodity Exchange Commission.
179
As the Supreme Court has noted, "where Congress has created a special
administrative procedure for the determination of the status of persons or compa-
nies under a regulatory act and has prescribed a procedure which meets all re-
170 534 F.2d at 174 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 166.
172 See Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,133
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
173 United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Robert W. Stark, Jr., Inc.
v. New York Stock Exch., 346 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd, 466 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1972).
174 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
175 Id. at 574-75.
176 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
177 Garner v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
178 Whitney Natl'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 419 (1965).
179 Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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quirements of due process, that remedy is exclusive."' 8 0 This precept has been
adhered to by courts in many different situations. In United Gas Corp. v. Pennzoil
Co. ,181 an attempt to enjoin the defendant from acquiring plaintiff's stock upon
the ground the acquisition would contravene the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act was denied. According to the court,
In the case at bar [plaintiff] seeks to have this court, before any of the procedures
provided by the Act have been or, indeed, could be invoked, predetermine the very
matters which Congress has expressly directed should be entrusted to the S.E.C.
Were the court to follow that course it would be usurping the functions of the S.E.C.
and flying in the face of the congressional mandate. Such a course is quite beyond
the powers of this court, equitable or otherwise and, indeed, would be basically un-
sound. 18
2
Similarly, in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 8 3 the Supreme Court held that
the Exchange's practice of fixing commission rates is not within a federal court's
jurisdiction because oversight of this aspect of exchange self-regulation is vested
in the SEC by section 19(b) of the Exchange Act.
The Supreme Court's refusal in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour'
8 4
to imply a private right of action because of such a right's incompatibility with
the regulatory scheme is particularly instructive. Barbour involved determination
of whether customers of a failing broker-dealer had "an implied private right of
action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970185 . . . to compel
SIPC to exercise its statutory authority for their benefit."' 86 In denying that the
plaintiff had a right to obtain an order compelling SIPC to invoke the statutory
provisions for the benefit of the broker-dealer's customers, the Court focused on
the regulatory scheme established by Congress. The Court noted that because of
receivership's severe effect, the application for the appointment of a receiver was
considered by SIPC to be "a last resort."'18 7 SIPC's constant monitoring of bro-
ker-dealers provided data with which it could determine whether an application
for appointment of a receiver was essential in a particular case or whether a
problem could be solved through less drastic means. The disruption a private
right of action would create underscored the conclusion that no private right of
action should be implied.
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Baird rule be "grandfathered,"
akin to treatment accorded to sections 10(b), 88 and 14(a), 89 of the Exchange Act.
Indeed, this is the premise of a recent decision upholding Baird.190 However, this
180 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940). See also Anniston Mfg. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937); Rawls v. United States, 331 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1964).
181 248 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y.), aj'd, 354 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1965).
182 248 F. Supp. at 454.
183 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
184 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
185 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1976 & Supp. 1978).
186 421 U.S. at 413-14.
187 Id. at 421.
188 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979), the
Supreme Court explained its former decision in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971) (implying private right of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5), as an acquiescence in the 25-
year old acceptance by the lower federal courts of such a cause of action. Of course, the Bankers Lz e
decision antedated the Redinglon analysis, which has greatly limited judicial implication of private rights of
action.
189 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
190 See Rich v. New York Stock Exch., Civ. No. 73-4642 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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is an insufficient and unpersuasive justification for retaining a precedent whose
underpinnings have been overruled sub silentlio by the Supreme Court. Denying
securities investors a negligence-based private damage action against a self-regu-
latory organization would simply require such investors to bear the same risk of
loss bank depositors or investors in money market instruments now bear. Bank
depositors have no right of action for negligence against national bank examiners
or the Comptroller of the Currency.
To be sure, a self-regulatory organization is only a quasi-administrative
agency and is not ipsofacto entitled to the sovereign immunity accorded govern-
ment agencies such as the SEC. On the other hand, a national securities ex-
change often acts in partnership with the SEC in many respects and exercises
quasi-governmental powers in discharging its responsibilities under the Exchange
Act. 19 1 Shielding an exchange from liability where it acts in good faith would
comport with the principle of self-regulation.1 92 As set forth in the legislative
history to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
[Self-regulatory] organizations should never be placed in the position of being insur-
ers of their members' compliance [with the Exchange Act and regulations thereun-
der]. They do, however, have an obligation to enforce applicable provisions of the
Exchange Act, and their own rules which they should not be permitted to avoid
except for good cause.
1 9 3
Abolishing the Baird rule would not affect the public investor's right to sue an
exchange for an intentional tort such as fraud.
19 4
191 See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 24, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179,
202-03.
192 Section 19(h)(4) of the Exchange Act, for example, imposes sanctions against self-regulatory offi-
cials who act wil4lfuly. Cf Exchange Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (good faith as partial defense for "control-
ling persons"). An exchange has not been held to be a "controlling person" under the Act. See Carr v.
New York Stock Exch., 414 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Accord, Baty v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost,
Inc., 471 F. Supp. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
At common law, a claim against an exchange for breach of a duty to supervise its members did not
exist. See, e.g., New York Stock Exch., v. Goodbody & Co., 42 A.D.2d 556, 345 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1st Dep't
1973); Raldiris v. Simmons, 266 N.Y. 577, 195 N.E. 208 (1935); Morganbesser v. New York Stock Exch.,
[1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,210 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971); New York
Stock Exch., v. Pickard & Co., 282 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1971); Krasnow v. Kern Sec. Corp., 175 N.Y.L.J.,
May 17, 1976, at 8, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
However, it is theoretically possible to posit a common law action against a national securities ex-
change through application of an expanded fiduciary duty doctrine. Although in Baird v. Franklin, 141
F.2d 238, 245-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), the court held that an exchange was not a
fiduciary (since exchange responsibilities did not encompass safeguarding securities or cash and were lim-
ited solely to investigating and disciplining its members), at least one commentator, consistent with Judge
Clark's dissent in Baird, has suggested that an exchange is a fiduciary. See Note, Exchange Liability for Net
Capital Enforcement, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1262, 1281 (1973):
There are [strong] reasons today for calling an exchange a fiduciary. First, the growth of pen-
sion, trust and mutual funds has brought the general public into the market. Second, wide-
spread advertising, particularly by the NYSE, has encouraged public trading by emphasizing
customer protection from broker losses and suggesting that the exchanges perform a fiduciary
role.
Yet, the fact that an exchange may advertise to the public at large or exercise oversight of member firms,
through whom fiduciary funds may be invested or with whom fiduciary funds may be entrusted, does not
thereby mean that an exchange itself is or should be a fiduciary. The majority opinion in Baird, to the
extent that it recognizes that an exchange actually has no direct fiduciary duties, seems sound. In any
event, this is a matter that should await legislative initiative.
193 S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34, repnntedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 179, 211.
194 See, e.g., Raldiris v. Simmons, 266 N.Y. 577, 195 N.E. 208 (1935) (New York Stock Exchange). See
also Aronson v. McCormick, 13 Misc. 2d 1077, 178 N.Y.S.2d N57 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afd, 6 A.D.2d
999, 177 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1958) (American Stock Exchange). Common law decisions have also
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Baird should be retained if its existence has ensured efficient and diligent
regulation by self-regulatory organizations. 195 However, empirical study in this
area has not been undertaken and no definitive conclusion can be reached. Since
no private investor has obtained a monetary judgment against an exchange
under section 6, the threat to an exchange arising from the possibility of such a
judgment may be more illusory than real.' 96 The threat that an exchange's regis-
tration will be revoked by the SEC--which sanction has been applied, albeit in
only one instance' 97-- probably provides a more potent deterrent. Moreover, re-
cent increases in SIPC insurance limits should minimize instances where a public
investor might suffer losses not covered by SIPC, as from the failure of a member
firm. 198
held that a contract market may be held liable for damages resulting from action ordered in bad faith by
its board of directors. See, e.g., Garcia Sugars Corp. v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exch., 7 N.Y.S.2d 532
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938), afdsub nom. Rifkind v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exch., 258 A.D. 871, 16
N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1st Dep't 1939). Accord, P.J. Taggares Co. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 476 F. Supp. 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lagorio v. Bd. of Trade, 529 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). Cf
Daniel v. Board of Trade, 164 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1947). In this regard, the fourth prong of the Cori test
makes it clear that no federal cause of action should be implied if the action is already cognizable at
common law.
195 Despite concern that the maintenance of a private right of action against an exchange would un-
duly burden the courts, this has not turned out to be the case. While the post-1968 financial crisis in the
securities industry did produce a series of 21 suits, many of them quite complex in scope, there is no firm
evidence that the judicial machinery was in danger of breaking down. See generaly Note, supra note 79, at
117 n.46.
196 Besides Baird o. Franklin, the courts have found that an exchange has breached its § 6 duty on only
two occasions. In Bright v. Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa.
1971), the P-B-W's Board of Directors had maneuvered to elect only nine of its constitutionally prescribed
ten directors. Plaintiff, an independent nominee, obtained a declaratory judgment that the exchange had
failed to comply with its internal election procedures. See general text accompanying note 86 supra.
In Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976), the
New York Stock Exchange was held to have breached a § 6 duty to a subordinated lender when it lifted
certain restrictions previously imposed upon a brokerage firm for violation of the Exchange's net capital
rules. Plaintiff did not recover damages, however, since the court found that he had waived his right to sue
the Exchange by conditioning the execution of his subordination agreement upon the very lifting of the
restrictions he now sought to attack as improper.
The lack of success of private § 6 suits reflects, in part, the difficult hurdles a plaintiff must overcome
in proving his case. Under the tort standard of Baird and its progeny, a plaintiff bears the burden of
proving (i) a breach of duty by the exchange, judged against all the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, and (ii) that the breach proximately caused injury. In cases where it is alleged that exchange actions
were inadequate, plaintiff must show that an exchange (i) should have performed differently, (ii) could
have performed differently, and (iii) but for the failure of an exchange to so perform, the losses incurred
could have been prevented. Seegenerally Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind.
1968), aj'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (applying concept of foreseeabil-
ity of loss). Moreover, plaintiffs in Bright and Hughes could not likely pursue each § 6 claims today. See
text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. See also Lenowitz Bi-Planning Security Corp. v. Philadelphia Stock
Exch., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,801 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (questioning vitality of the Bright
decision).
197 See San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967).
198 Prior to October 10, 1980, customer accounts, pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 aaa-lll (1976 & Supp. 1978), were insured up to $100,000 (except that claims
for cash, as distinct from claims for securities, could not exceed $40,000). See 15 U.S.C. § 78 ffi-3 (Supp.
1978). Effective October 10, 1980, SIPA was amended to increase the insurance coverage from the
$100,000/$40,000 level to $500,000/$100,000. See Pub. L. No. 96-433, 94 Stat. 1855 (1980). The legisla-
tive history reveals that the purpose of this amendment was three-fold: (i) to match the recently increased
insurance levels for deposits with federally insured banks, (ii) to provide for further customer confidence in
dealing with individual securities firms, and (iii) to promote the immobilization of stock certificates by
encouraging customers to maintain their securities with broker/dealers. See H.R. REP. No. 1321, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-2 reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7250-5 1.
SIPA is funded by assessments paid by the securities industry. At the present time, the SIPC trust
fund exceeds $200 million. Id. Since member assessments, a cost of doing business, are presumably shifted
by broker-dealers to investors, the increase in SIPA limits should ultimately be borne by investors. That
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Regrettably, the ALI Federal Securities Code t 99 has skirted the issue of an
express private right of action under what is now section 6 of the Exchange Act.
Although the Code makes express a private right of action for violations in sec-
tions 7,200 10201 and 14202 of the Exchange Act, the issues raised by Baird are left
to judicial development. 20 3 Under the tests for the implication of a private right
of action enunciated in section 1722 of the Code,20 4 Baird's survival is uncer-
tain.
20 5
In his reporter's notes to the Code, Professor Louis Loss writes:
Even if it were assumed that all these lower court holdings [such as Bairdv. Frank-
lin] should be codified into express civil liability provisions, it would be impractical
to do so. And, in any event, cases under other provisions would continue to crop up
• . . unless the Code were affirmatively to foreclose all private actions as § 410(g) of
the Uniform Securities Act does. . . . Further judicial development is as essential as
it is unavoidable.
2 0 6
Although Professor Loss's concern against foreclosing common law development
investors, the users of the market, should be the payers of this kind of insurance seems only fair and
economically efficient.
199 The Federal Securities Code has been adopted by the American Law Institute and was recently
endorsed by the SEC. See [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,655 (Sept. 18, 1980). The Code is now
before the Congress.
200 15 U.S.C. § 78 g (1976).
201 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
202 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
203 Under § 1822(a)(2) of the Code, federal courts have concurrent (not exclusive) jurisdiction of civil
actions created by or based on a violation of the Code. Baird would fall in the category of an action based
on a violation of the Code. State courts faced with the question of whether or not to follow Baird would be
required to apply federal common law, a "reverse Erie" [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 1938)] situation.
See 2 ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1822, Comment 5 (1980).
204 2 ALl, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1722(a) (1980). Section 1722(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) IMPLIED ACTIONS.-A court, considering the nature of the defendant's conduct,
the degree of his culpability, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the deterrent effect of
recognizing a private action based on a violation of this Code, may recognize such an action
even though it is not expressly created by part XVII [of the Code, dealing with Civil Liability],
but only if (1) the action is not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions in any of the
actions expressly created or with the scheme of this Code, (2) the provision, rule, or order that is
the basis of the action is designed for the special benefit of a class of persons to which the
plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged, (3) the plaintiff satisfies the court that under
the circumstances the type of remedy sought is not disproportionate to the alleged violation,
and (4) in cases. . . that specifiy] a maximum measure of damages, a comparable maximum is
imposed.
205 It is the author's view that implication of a private right of action under § 6 is inconsistent with the
present statutory-scheme because it usurps or potentially usurps the role of the SEC. See text accompany-
ing notes 91-122, 168-175 supra. It can be further argued that, at the very least, implication of a private
right of action in favor of public investors is inconsistent with implication of such a right in favor of
partners in member firms and subordinated lenders. See note 10 supra. But see Note, supra note 79. More-
over, it also appears that the second factor set forth in § 1722(a) is not met in this case either. The
Supreme Court has specifically held that courts should not infer an intent to create a private remedy
merely from Congress's expressed desire to benefit the public generally. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975).
On the other hand, the Code is not meant to be a restatement of the current law, see 2 ALl, FEDERAL
SECURITIES CODE § 1716, Comment (6) (1980), and the factors set forth in § 1722 do differ, at least in
emphasis, from recent Supreme Court pronouncements. Indeed, in the reporter's comments it is conceded
that "the implication of private actions under the SEC statutes would not be easy to square with the
Supreme Court's recent emphasis on (a) statutory construction, (b) legislative intention to create a private
action (which, to be sure, may be evidenced implicitly), and (c) the expressio unius exdusio alterius approach."
2 ALI, FEDERAL SECURrITES CODE § 1722, Comment (2) (1980). To the extent the Code is attempting to
sidestep decisions such as Redinglon and Transameria Mortgage Advisors and re-emphasize the Borak ap-
proach, then the Baird rule should be considerably easier to sustain.
206 See 2 ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 1722, Comment (3) (1980).
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is justifiable, there appears to be no reason why Congress cannot, during its cur-
rent consideration of the Code, address directly the question of exchange liability
to public investors. Predetermining liability is traditionally a legislative function
and the present re-examination of the securities laws presents Congress an oppor-




The basic question surrounding implication of a private right of action for
damages against a national securities exchange under section 6 of the Exchange
Act is who can best exercise control over exchange conduct, the courts or the
SEC. Through a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has warned lower
courts not to arrogate power by implying private rights of action for statutory
violations in the absence of an express congressional mandate. "Absent evidence
of clear intent, judicial creation of a private remedy amounts to an assumption or
207 With respect to self-regulatory organizational rules, the Code, in § 1721, provides an express private
right of action where such rules have been declared by the SEC to be actionable. Other rules may be
recognized as the basis for private actions in accordance with the principle of common law and equity,
applied as a matter of federal jurisprudence, unless they have been excluded by Commission rule. Com-
mission rules are binding on the courts, whether such rules are inclusionary or exclusionary.
Section 1721 provides:
(a) DETERMINATION OF RULES TO WHICH SECTION APPLIES.-A member of
or participant in a self-regulatory organization who violates a rule of the organization, or a
broker, dealer, municipal broker, or municipal dealer within section 905(c) who violates a rule
prescribed under that section, is liable to his customer for any loss caused by the violation if-
(1) the rule violated has been determined by Commission rule to be within section 1721; or
(2) a court, except with respect to those rules determined by Commission rule not to be
within section 1721, decides that a private right of action under this Code should be recognized
in accordance with the principles of common law and equity, applied as a matter of Federal
jurisprudence, and the standards of section 1722(a).
(b) COMMISSION'S RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.-The rules of the Commission
may designate either specific self-regulatory organization (or section 905(c)) rules or categories
of such rules that are or are not within section 1721.
(c) CRITERIA TO GUIDE COMMISSION.-Among the criteria that the Commission
shall consider in exercising its authority under section 1721 are (1) whether the particular self-
regulatory organization rule was required by the Commission to be adopted, amended, or sup-
plemented, (2) whether the particular rule is substantially a substitute for or parallel to a tule of
the Commission (other than a section 905(c) rule), (3) whether the particular rule is designed for
the special benefit of a class of persons to which a potential plaintiff belongs against the kind of
harm alleged, and (4) the risk, in the case of a self-regulatory organization rule, that the imposi-
tion of liability under section 1721 will discourage the organization from full performance of its
intended role.
(d) NONRETROACTIVITY.-No rule change adopted by the Commission under sec-
tion 1721 after a violation has occurred affects an action based on that violation.
The Code seeks to strike a balance between leaving everything to the courts, which would promote uncer-
tainty, and leaving everything to Commission rulemaking, which might invite excessive coverage. See 2
ALI, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1721, Comment 5 (1980). The author believes that member firms
should continue to be liable to their customers when firms violate self-regulatory rules such as those that
concern churning, suitability and the like. However, it is the SEC, and not the judiciary, which should be
drawing the distinction between actionable and non-actionable rules.
For a review of approaches to the question of implied private rights of action for rule violations, see
Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers under SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REV. 15 (1969)
(arguing that violation of the NASD suitability rule can be used as evidence of fraud but that the NASD
rule was no substitute for an SEC rule); Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customerfor Violation of
a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 253 (1970) (applying test of Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), as to whether the organiza-
tional rule is basically a substitute for an SEC rule); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 12 (1966) (all non-housekeeping rules to be actionable).
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usurpation of the legislative function in violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine."
2 0 8
Baird v Franklin and its progeny warrant careful re-examination. The ra-
tionale of Baird v. Franklin conflicts with the teachings of Touche-Ross & Co. V.
Redz'zglon. Moreover, the existence of a private right of action for damages may
place a court or jury in the position of second-guessing SEC decisions regarding
exchange supervision and thereby impair, rather than complement, effective reg-
ulation of capital markets.
208 See Leist v. Simplot, 2 CoMM. FurT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051 (2d Cir. 1980).
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